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Labor Market Adjustment to 
Globalization, Automation, and 
Institutional Reform
Brendan Price
My dissertation consists of four independent essays 
analyzing how workers and firms adapt to changes in trade, 
technology, and labor market institutions. Chapter 1 analyzes 
the labor market effects of Germany’s 2005 Hartz IV reform, 
which lowered the generosity of long-term unemployment 
insurance (UI) available after a worker’s initial stream of 
benefits runs out. Using administrative data on over 336,000 
German UI claims, I exploit cross-worker heterogeneity 
in the timing of Hartz IV’s effective onset to estimate how 
long-term benefit cuts affect jobless durations, wages, and 
job characteristics. Consistent with anticipatory behavior 
among affected workers, the hazard rate of reemployment 
starts rising several months before cuts bind, culminating in 
a much larger “spike at UI exhaustion” under Hartz IV. My 
estimates imply that the UI reform reduced the probability 
of a one-year jobless spell by 12.4 percent, with employ-
ment gains driven by full-time jobs. Decomposing Hartz 
IV’s effect on post-UI wages into wage losses from lower 
reservation wages and offsetting wage gains from shorter 
jobless spells, I find that reservation wages dominate, as 
workers experiencing benefit cuts accept lower-paying jobs. 
At the aggregate level, a partial equilibrium calculation sug-
gests that Hartz IV’s causal effect on individual job finding 
lowered Germany’s steady-state unemployment rate by 0.9 
percentage points.
Chapter 2, coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David 
Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, argues that rising 
Chinese import competition was a major force behind both 
recent reductions in U.S. manufacturing employment and 
weak overall U.S. job growth. Using an instrumental vari-
ables strategy based on Chinese exports to other high-income 
countries, we show that manufacturing industries directly 
exposed to Chinese import competition contract sharply rela-
tive to less-exposed industries. These direct impacts are aug-
mented by input-output linkages and persist in local general 
equilibrium. Our central estimates suggest import-induced 
job losses over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.
Chapter 3, also coauthored with Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, 
and Hanson, reassesses the conventional wisdom that 
investments in information technology (IT) have dramati-
cally boosted productivity while making workers redundant. 
Examining IT usage in U.S. manufacturing, we find only 
mixed evidence of faster productivity growth in IT-intensive 
industries. Surprisingly, output in IT-intensive industries 
falls relative to other manufacturing industries. Increases in 
productivity, when detectable, reflect even faster declines in 
employment.
Chapter 4 exploits German high school reforms to esti-
mate how sharp fluctuations in cohort size impact entry-level 
labor markets. These reforms, which eliminated grade 13 at 
upper-track high schools, led to an idiosyncratically timed 
“double cohort” in each reforming state, as students grad-
uated under both old and new rules. Consistent with the 
small share of upper-track graduates who immediately enter 
firm-based apprenticeships, new training contracts jump by 
2 percent in double-cohort years. I find no clear evidence 
that lower- and middle-track graduates are crowded out of 
training positions, but the results are imprecise.
Chapter 1
The Duration and Wage Effects of Long-
Term Unemployment Benefits: Evidence from 
Germany’s Hartz IV Reform
Displaced workers often exhaust their unemployment 
benefits before returning to work. Rather than ceasing benefit 
payments entirely, many countries—including Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, and Spain—
rely on two-tiered systems of UI that combine generous 
time-limited benefits with more modest benefits thereafter 
(Esser et al. 2013). These long-term benefits loom especially 
large for workers at the greatest risk of experiencing lengthy 
jobless spells, which erode employment prospects, deplete 
savings, and impose fiscal externalities through transfer pay-
ments and foregone tax revenue. Yet despite the widespread 
use of two-tiered benefit schedules, and despite renewed 
interest in long-term unemployment in the wake of the Great 
Recession, little is known about how long-term UI benefits 
affect jobless durations and post-UI wages.1
This paper analyzes the employment and wage effects of 
Germany’s 2005 Hartz IV reform, a prominent and contro-
versial measure that reduced long-term benefit levels for 
both new and incumbent UI claimants. Germany historically 
has had one of the most generous UI systems in the OECD, 
including long-term benefits that may last indefinitely. By 
the early 2000s, increasing UI caseloads—together with a 
widespread sentiment that the safety net had become too 
generous—created political pressure for a series of labor 
market reforms, whose centerpiece was Hartz IV. On January 
1, 2005, existing long-term UI recipients—who numbered 
2.2 million and comprised 5.3 percent of the civilian labor 
force on the eve of reform—were switched overnight to the 
new, typically lower, postreform benefit level.2 Subsequent 
inflows into long-term UI were subject to the new rules upon 
exhausting their initial stream of short-term benefits. The 
lack of grandfathering for incumbent claimants, together 
with concurrent changes in labor market conditions and insti-
tutions, poses difficulties for some of the standard quasi-ex-
perimental methods that are used to evaluate UI reforms.3
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To overcome these challenges, I exploit cross-worker and 
cross-cohort variation in the timing of Hartz IV’s effective 
onset—based on individual heterogeneity in the potential 
duration of short-term benefits—to identify the causal effects 
of policy-induced benefit cuts. Short-term benefit duration is 
determined by age and work history, and it ranges from mere 
weeks to 22 months for the claimants in my sample. The ba-
sic intuition behind my research design is that the longer this 
initial stream of benefits lasts, the more insulated a claimant 
is from cuts to long-term benefits, because those cuts occur 
later in her jobless spell.4
My research design can be understood as a generalization 
of difference-in-differences. To fix ideas, consider a group 
of workers entitled to 12 months of short-term benefits, who 
enter UI in either 2001 or 2005. All else equal, the 2005 en-
trants should find jobs faster, since they face steeper benefit 
cuts if they exhaust short-term benefits. Of course, many 
other factors—such as labor demand, credit supply, or claim-
ant characteristics—might have changed in these years. To 
difference these out, now consider workers entitled to only 
6 months of short-term benefits. As before, we would expect 
the 2005 cohort to find jobs faster, but this tendency should 
(and does) manifest more quickly for the 6-month group be-
cause they face the Hartz IV treatment earlier in their jobless 
spells. As such, the difference-in-differences captures the 
relative effect of Hartz IV on the more-exposed group. I gen-
eralize beyond this 2 x 2 example by including workers with 
any possible short-term benefit duration, as well as interme-
diate cohorts that were in effect partly exposed to Hartz IV.5
I implement my research design using administrative 
social security and UI records provided by Germany’s In-
stitute for Employment Research (IAB). Starting from a 4.7 
percent sample of newly unemployed workers, I construct an 
estimation sample of over 336,000 new UI claims made by 
prime-age displaced workers during 2001–2005. Formally, 
I estimate flexible discrete-time proportional hazard mod-
els (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978), which allow me to track 
changes in job-finding behavior as workers approach up to 
two distinct step-downs in benefit level: the exhaustion of 
short-term benefits, plus the incremental benefit cuts induced 
by Hartz IV. These events coincide for workers who exhaust 
short-term benefits after January 1, 2005, but they differ for 
the many claimants who are “caught in midstream,” so that I 
am able to separately identify their effects.
Even before Hartz IV, the job-finding hazard exhibited 
a “spike at UI exhaustion”—a classic result dating back 
to Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990). Above and 
beyond this “main effect” of benefit exhaustion, however, job 
finding rises markedly in the months leading up to reform- 
induced benefit cuts. The rising hazard rate—indicative of 
forward-looking behavior on the part of job seekers— 
culminates in a much larger exhaustion spike than was 
evident before the reform. Mapping from hazard rates to sur-
vival functions, my preferred estimates imply that a worker 
subject to the postreform benefit schedule is 12.4 percent less 
likely to experience a one-year jobless spell.6
Perhaps surprisingly, these employment gains are pri-
marily driven by full-time jobs. Critics of Hartz IV allege 
that draconian benefit cuts have compelled job seekers to 
accept low-paying “minijobs,” a class of marginal, part-time 
positions that grew markedly during the 2000s. But estimates 
from a competing-risks version of my benchmark specifi-
cation show that, if anything, fewer workers transition into 
minijobs under Hartz IV.
I next extend my econometric model to analyze Hartz 
IV’s effects on the wages workers receive upon being 
reemployed. Prior work has noted that UI generosity has 
offsetting effects on subsequent wages (Nekoei and Weber 
2017). Benefit cuts may lower post-UI wages by depressing 
reservation wages, as workers accept lower-paying jobs 
when their outside option is worsened. Conversely, benefit 
cuts may increase wages by shortening jobless durations, 
thereby reducing any erosion of earnings capacity associated 
with time out of work. Economists have found mixed evi-
dence of how changes to short-term UI benefits affect wages, 
with negative, positive, and many null results abounding in 
the literature. I know of no prior studies that estimate the 
wage effects of changes in long-term UI benefit levels.
To explore this question, I jointly estimate my hazard 
model alongside a wage equation measuring how newly ac-
cepted wage offers vary with the time remaining until Hartz 
IV binds. I show that workers accept lower-paying jobs as 
they approach reform-induced benefit cuts, consistent with 
falling reservation wages. To quantify these impacts, I adapt 
expressions from Schmieder et al. (2016) to decompose the 
net wage effect of Hartz IV into a reservation wage effect, 
an offsetting duration effect, and a selection term capturing 
selection into reemployment along a rich set of observable 
dimensions. The reservation wage effect dominates: I con-
clude that UI reform reduced mean reemployment wages by 
1.9 percent. As a corroborating piece of evidence, I show that 
Hartz IV increased recalls to previous employers as well as 
transitions to brand-new jobs. Insofar as recall offers amount 
to options that workers choose (or decline) to exercise, the 
rise in recalls confirms that workers derive lower reservation 
utility from remaining jobless under the new UI regime.
The Hartz reforms, and Hartz IV in particular, have been 
identified as possible drivers of an “employment miracle” 
that saw Germany’s unemployment rate fall by 6.6 percent-
age points between December 2004 and December 2015. I 
use my causal estimates of Hartz IV’s effects on individual 
job finding to gauge what these partial equilibrium effects 
imply for aggregate unemployment.7 Using a steady-state 
formula that allows for duration dependence in job finding, I 
calculate that the UI reform reduced Germany’s unemploy-
ment rate by 0.9 percentage points. Strikingly, almost all this 
decrease stems from the long-term component of unemploy-
ment (spells of over 12 months), echoing Ljungqvist and 
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Sargent’s (1998) claim that long-term UI benefits are a major 
determinant of the incidence of long-term joblessness.
Chapter 2
Import Competition and the Great U.S. 
Employment Sag of the 2000s
(coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David 
Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, published in the Journal of Labor 
Economics, 2016, 34[S1 part 2]: S141–S198)
During the 1990s, the U.S. labor market exhibited a vigor 
not seen in decades, with rising employment rates along-
side rapid wage growth and low inflation. During the early 
to mid-2000s, however, U.S. employment growth largely 
stalled before turning sharply negative with the onset of 
the Great Recession. In this paper, we explore a leading 
candidate for the post-2000 “sag” in U.S. employment: the 
dramatic rise in Chinese import penetration that occurred 
during this period. We argue that surging Chinese imports—
driven by rapid Chinese productivity growth and by lower 
institutional barriers to U.S.–China trade—have been a major 
contributor to both job losses in U.S. manufacturing and, 
through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium 
mechanisms, weak overall U.S. job growth.
The key empirical challenge in gauging these impacts is 
to isolate the portion of rising Chinese imports attributable 
to supply-side Chinese factors.8 Adapting an instrumental 
variables strategy introduced by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 
(2013), we instrument for U.S. imports from China using 
Chinese exports to a set of eight other high-income coun-
tries.9 We then estimate two-stage-least-squares models of 
changes in industry-level outcomes on changes in exposure 
to Chinese imports, over the stacked periods 1991–1999 and 
1999–2011. We measure industry-level outcomes using the 
County Business Patterns and the NBER-CES Manufactur-
ing Industry Database, produced by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and the U.S. Census Bureau’s Center for 
Economic Studies (Becker et al. 2013).
We find that a 1 percentage point increase in Chinese 
import penetration within a given manufacturing industry 
reduces domestic industry employment by 1.3 percentage 
points. Employment losses are pervasive across import- 
competing sectors and robust to a battery of control strate-
gies.10 Although our data do not report employment by edu-
cation groups, steeper job losses among blue-collar produc-
tion workers than among white-collar nonproduction workers 
suggest that less-educated workers have been hardest hit by 
import competition. Quantitatively, our estimates imply that 
the direct effect of Chinese import competition can explain 
the loss of 560,000 manufacturing jobs during 1999–2011.
Direct import substitution is only one of several chan-
nels by which import exposure may erode employment. 
Prior literature has highlighted the potential importance 
of input-output linkages, whereby firms may be indirectly 
impacted when their customers or suppliers are exposed to 
trade shocks (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Long and Plosser 1983). 
We use the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 1992 input- 
output tables to trace out how industry employment responds 
to such indirect import exposure. We find robust evidence 
that industries—both within and outside of manufactur-
ing—shed employment when their customers are hard-hit by 
trade competition.11 Accounting for these “upstream” effects, 
whereby trade shocks propagate from buyers to suppliers, 
increases our estimate of trade-induced job losses over 1999–
2011 to 985,000 in manufacturing and to 1.98 million in the 
overall economy.
These effects may be either augmented or dampened 
by other general equilibrium mechanisms. Earnings losses 
due to fewer jobs and lower wages may depress aggregate 
demand, resulting in additional employment declines. At the 
same time, job losses in trade-exposed sectors may be partly 
or even entirely offset by reallocation into nonexposed sec-
tors, as reductions in wages and increases in the number of 
job seekers encourage unscathed firms to post new vacancies 
and expand their workforces. Refining an analysis pioneered 
by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we gauge the net effect 
of these several mechanisms by contrasting the evolution 
of employment in local labor markets (“commuting zones”) 
whose industry structures render them differentially exposed 
to Chinese import competition. At the local level, we find 
substantial job losses in trade-exposed industries with no 
evidence of offsetting job growth in nonexposed industries, 
suggesting that the job losses detected by our national  
industry-level analysis persist in local general equilibrium. 
On net, our local analysis points to trade-induced job losses 
over 1999–2011 on the order of 2.4 million. In ongoing 
work, we are using plant-level microdata from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau to shed additional light on these general equilib-
rium channels.
While these numbers must be interpreted with caution, 
our results suggest that Chinese import competition has been 
an important contributor to weak U.S. job growth in the new 
millennium.
Chapter 3
Return of the Solow Paradox? Information 
Technology, Productivity, and Employment in 
U.S. Manufacturing
(coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, 
and Gordon Hanson, published in the American Economic 
Review Papers & Proceedings, 2014, 104[5]: 394–399)
An influential “technological-discontinuity” paradigm, 
powerfully articulated by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011), 
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argues that U.S. workplaces have been fundamentally 
transformed by investments in information technology (IT). 
This argument rests on two claims. First, in a departure from 
Robert Solow’s famous observation that “you can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” 
(Solow 1987), proponents of this view assert that IT has by 
now had pervasive positive effects on labor productivity. 
Second, by enabling firms to expand output while shedding 
employment, automation is giving rise to a smaller role for 
workers in the modern workplace—as evidenced by recent 
declines in the labor share of income (Karabarbounis and 
Neiman 2014).
This paper reassesses these claims in the context of the 
U.S. manufacturing sector. We make two simple points. First, 
the evidence that IT investments are associated with rapid 
productivity gains is weaker than might be supposed, at least 
in manufacturing. Second, when detectable at all, IT-driven 
growth in labor productivity appears to stem from declines 
in output together with even steeper declines in employment. 
This surprising pattern runs counter to our basic intuitions 
about cost-reducing technological progress.
We use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Data-
base to track industry-level employment, output, and labor 
productivity over the period 1980–2009. Following Berman, 
Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger 
(1998), we begin by defining each industry’s “IT intensity” as 
the ratio of IT capital investments to all capital investments. 
We then estimate descriptive, event-study specifications to 
examine how labor productivity has evolved over time in 
IT-intensive industries, relative to less-intensive industries.
At first blush, IT-intensive industries have notched  
impressive growth in labor productivity: a one-standard- 
deviation increase in IT intensity is associated with a 10-log-
point boost in productivity growth per decade. But this 
IT-productivity nexus is driven almost entirely by the indus-
tries that produce IT. Excluding the computer and semicon-
ductor sectors, and focusing instead on IT-using industries, 
we find scant signs that greater IT intensity is associated 
with faster growth in labor productivity.12 The IT-productiv-
ity relationship is sensitive to the choice of IT measure, and 
regardless of measure we find no evidence of differential 
productivity growth after 2000.13
Furthermore, if IT has indeed reduced production costs, 
basic producer theory would predict that firms should 
respond by expanding output (with ambiguous effects on 
employment due to offsetting scale and substitution effects). 
Empirically, however, IT-intensive industries have exhibited 
relative declines in both output and employment since the 
early 1990s. This fact pattern is difficult to square with a sim-
ple, neoclassical story in which technological advances are 
making workers redundant.
Taken together, our findings serve as a cautionary note 
that—at least within U.S. manufacturing—prior resolutions 
of the “Solow paradox” may be incomplete.
Chapter 4
Can Local Labor Markets Absorb Crowded 
Cohorts? Evidence from German High School 
Reforms
Every year, local labor markets must absorb new en-
tering cohorts whose size and composition fluctuate over 
time. An increase in cohort size (say, due to a baby boom) 
heightens competition for jobs, university slots, and other 
scarce resources (Bound and Turner 2007; Welch 1979), but 
downward wage pressure and the ease of cherry-picking 
good candidates in a buyer’s market gives firms incentives 
to create new jobs. Analyzing how workers and firms adjust 
to oversized cohorts can shed light on a host of questions 
about job search and job creation. But studying the equilib-
rium impact of labor supply shifts is difficult because many 
such shifts occur gradually over long periods of time, during 
which technology, tastes, and institutions are unlikely to 
remain constant.14
I overcome this challenge by exploiting sharp fluctuations 
in local labor supply induced by German state-level high 
school reforms. These reforms compressed the curriculum at 
upper-track high schools (“gymnasia”), so that students grad-
uate after grade 12 instead of grade 13.15 Between 2007 and 
2016, each reforming state experienced one idiosyncratically 
timed year in which two cohorts of gymnasium students 
graduated simultaneously: the last thirteenth graders subject 
to the old rules, plus the first twelfth graders subject to the 
new ones. Although most upper-track graduates proceed 
immediately to university, some instead enter Germany’s 
famed firm-based apprenticeship system. As such, these 
“double cohorts” should increase the supply of workers to 
local apprentice markets.16
Using state-level aggregates published by Germany’s 
Federal Statistical Office and other sources, I estimate 
event-study specifications showing how education and labor 
markets adapt to the double cohorts. I find that the number 
of gymnasium graduates rises by roughly two-thirds in the 
year of a double cohort. Total high school graduates rise by 
22 percent.17 Next, I show that the number of newly signed 
apprenticeship contracts increases by about 2 percent in a 
double-cohort year. Though modest, this increase is precisely 
estimated, and I can easily reject the null hypothesis that 
short-run firm demand for new apprentices is perfectly in-
elastic: local employers absorb at least some of the increase 
in labor supply by hiring more trainees than usual.18 Decom-
posing the increase in apprenticeships by high school degree 
type reveals that the increase is driven by upper-track grad-
uates. I find no clear evidence that lower- and middle-track 
students not subject to the curricular reform are crowded out 
of the apprenticeship market, but the effects are imprecise.
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In ongoing work with Simon Janssen and Markus Nagler, 
I am exploring how the double cohorts affected job posting, 
the skill content of new jobs, employer screening practices, 
and worker-firm matching. Future work will also exploit 
within-state variation in treatment intensity to more precisely 
identify crowd-out effects and to study the spatial propaga-
tion of cohort shocks.
Notes
 1. An important exception is Kolsrud et al. (2017), who use a 
regression-kink design to show that Swedish workers are more 
responsive to changes in short-term UI benefit levels than to 
comparable changes in long-term levels. I complement their 
study by using a different design applied to a different policy 
change in a different institutional setting and by analyzing 
effects on a broader array of labor market outcomes.
  2. Data limitations preclude exact calculation of the reform- 
induced change in household income experienced by each claim-
ant. For this reason, my research design relies on the timing of 
benefit cuts—which I can compute accurately—rather than their 
magnitude. For context, however, I adapt the OECD Tax-Benefit 
Model to simulate Germany’s entire tax-and-transfer system, 
in an effort to gauge how Hartz IV impacted household balance 
sheets. For my estimation sample of prime-age displaced work-
ers, I estimate that the median claimant would incur a 5 percent 
decline in postexhaustion household income, with one-quarter 
of claimants facing declines of over 10 percent and a minority 
obtaining higher income under the new regime.
 3. Existing evaluations of Hartz IV have typically relied on 
time-series identification (Nagl and Weber 2014) or on cal-
ibrated macroeconomic search-and-matching models (e.g., 
Bradley and Kuegler 2016; Krause and Uhlig 2012; Krebs and 
Scheffel 2013; Launov and Wälde 2013).
 4. Far-off cuts are discounted both because of pure time prefer-
ence and because many claimants will find work before they 
ever bind. Using a continuous-time job search model based 
on Mortensen (1977), I show that cuts to long-term benefits 
increase job finding and decrease reservation wages at all 
jobless durations, and that these behavioral responses limit to 
zero as cuts lie increasingly far in the future. For many common 
functional forms, these effects dampen monotonically with time 
remaining until the benefit cut.
 5. Because incumbent claimants were not grandfathered in under 
the old system, all pre-Hartz UI entrants would eventually 
encounter Hartz IV if they remained unemployed in January 
2005. Empirically, I track changes in job-finding hazards for 
claimants whose Hartz IV benefit cuts bind in nine months or 
fewer, relative to claimants for whom Hartz IV binds in 10 
months or more. If workers begin responding even at such long 
horizons, my estimates will yield conservative lower bounds on 
Hartz IV’s true effects.
 6. This core finding is robust to a host of control strategies, includ-
ing a falsification exercise in which I alter the assumed date of 
the Hartz IV reform. Furthermore, among incumbent pre-Hartz 
IV claimants, responsiveness to Hartz IV is strongly correlated 
with a proxy for the size of the benefit cut.
 7. In general equilibrium, these direct impacts may be either offset 
by congestion externalities or augmented by job creation. Using 
both individual and local variation in Austrian UI benefit gen-
erosity, Lalive et al. (2015) find that the “macro elasticity” of 
job finding to changes in UI is about 20 percent smaller than the 
micro elasticity. If the same is true here, my aggregate impacts 
should be multiplied by four-fifths.
 8. Consider two concerns. On the one hand, if rising import 
penetration in a U.S. industry reflects booming domestic 
demand, then regressions of industry employment growth on 
import penetration will be biased upward. On the other hand, if 
rising imports reflect adverse shocks to domestic input costs or 
domestic TFP, then such regressions will be biased downward.
  9. In related work, Pierce and Schott (2016) use an alternative 
instrumental variables strategy based on nominal industry expo-
sure to the U.S. conferral of Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
to China in 2000–2001.
 10. Our results are robust to controlling for differential employment 
trends within one-digit manufacturing subsectors; industry 
capital intensity and skill intensity; U.S. exports to China; and 
other concerns. Reassuringly, a falsification exercise using 
the periods 1971–1981 and 1981–1991—predating the rapid 
growth in Chinese import penetration—shows no indication of 
disemployment effects during this period.
11. Shocks to an industry’s suppliers have theoretically ambiguous 
effects on that industry’s employment: firms whose suppliers 
are subject to intense Chinese competition may benefit from 
cheap foreign inputs, but they may also suffer from the loss 
of domestic suppliers that often provide customized inputs. 
Consistent with these offsetting mechanisms, our estimated 
“downstream” effects are imprecise and unstable in sign.
12. In related work, Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon (2015) find 
that recent productivity growth in manufacturing as a whole 
is largely driven by IT-producing industries. Our contribution 
is to show that, outside of these industries, there is no robust 
relationship between IT intensity and productivity growth.
13. We also consider alternative measures of IT intensity, including 
a set of 17 advanced technologies coded in the 1988 and 1993 
Surveys of Manufacturing Technologies (Doms, Dunne, and 
Troske 1997). The SMT measure provides stronger evidence 
for an IT-productivity nexus, but the relationship again flattens 
after 2000.
14. Even when sharp cohort shocks can be identified, they may be 
endogenous to labor market conditions, or they may involve 
increased labor supply among populations (such as immigrants 
or welfare recipients) that differ considerably from the typical 
cohort of new labor market entrants. My study avoids these 
concerns.
15. The reforms sought to harmonize Germany’s education system 
with the rest of Europe and to buttress public finances by 
extending working lives. Double cohorts were an unintended 
but unavoidable side-effect.
16. Several papers have analyzed the impact of these reforms on 
educational attainment (e.g., Huebener and Marcus 2017; Mar-
cus and Zambre 2016). To my knowledge, however, my paper 
is the first to identify equilibrium impacts of the high school 
reforms on the German labor market. Related work by Morin 
(2015) studies how Ontario’s 2003 double cohort—which 
resulted from a high school reform very similar to those in 
Germany—impacted labor market outcomes among high school 
graduates. Ontario’s shock decreased both youth employment 
rates and youth wages, with wages falling by 5–9 percent two 
years later.
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 17. About one-third of German secondary school students attend 
gymnasia. The gymnasium graduation count rises less than 
one-for-one because of grade repetition, grade-skipping, and 
track-switching.
 18. This result also confirms that local labor supply shocks have 
disproportionate local effects. If newly minted graduates were 
perfectly mobile, local supply gluts would simply diffuse 
nationwide.
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